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       ompressed tactical decision cycles will be the fulcrum of future, fast-
paced hyper-war. AI weapon systems promise to extend and maximize hu-
man capabilities, becoming essential to the survivability and lethality of 
armed forces in this lethal operating environment. AI is not the weapon; it 
is the component or element of a weapon system—most likely a military 
network or “Military Internet of Things” that will accelerate the speed and 
decision making in the application of fires or effects.1 The networked force 
will inform enterprise-wide situational awareness and battle management. 
Forces are unlikely to field “killer robots”—solitary entities carrying weap-
ons and making life and death decisions free of human command. Instead, 
creation and employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) will re-
quire a well-defined operational environment and access to rich, accurate, 
extremely large data sets, such as GPS, fed by distributed sensors, plus im-
proved machine learning algorithms and high-performance processors that 
will fuse AI into the kill chain.2 The kill chain process combines multispectral 
sensors to understand the warfighting environment, positively identify, track, 
and select targets, and engage them with the most appropriate effects.3 (The 
Soviet Union referred to this process as the “reconnaissance strike com-
plex,” while in the 1990s, John Boyd in the United States popularized the 
term, “OODA loop,” in which armed forces race to observe, orient, decide 
and act before their adversary).4 AI is designed to facilitate this adaptive, 
multi-domain, high velocity decision making model, and in doing so it is ex-
pected to provide a decisive military advantage. Part II of this study recounts 
the current and potential uses of AI in the U.S. armed forces during armed 
conflict.  
 
1. CHRISTIAN BROSE, THE KILL CHAIN: DEFENDING AMERICA IN THE FUTURE OF 
HIGH-TECH WARFARE 141–60 (2020). 
2. Id. at xviii.  
3. RICHARD S. DEAKIN, BATTLESPACE TECHNOLOGIES: NETWORK-ENABLED INFOR-
MATION DOMINANCE 473–75 (2010).  
4. Christian Brose, The New Revolution in Military Affairs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 
2019, at 122, 122–23 (Russian “strike-reconnaissance complex”); Bradley Perrett, China's 
Growing Ability to Drive Away U.S. Forces, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 28, 
2018, at 56 (China’s lethal kill chain); BARRY SCOTT ZELLEN, THE ART OF WAR IN AN 
ASYMMETRIC WORLD: STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 81–82 (2012) (describes 












In Part III, the study turns toward the rules applicable to the employ-
ment of AI in war. All methods and means of war, including AI, must con-
form to the law of war, also called the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or 
international humanitarian law (IHL). Commanders are accountable for en-
suring that methods and means at their disposal and under their command, 
including AWS, comply with the principles of LOAC, such as distinction, 
proportionality and the rule requiring precautions in attack.  
Part IV explores an effort by the Member States of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to develop standards that will help 
ensure compliance of AWS with LOAC. The CCW has convened a group 
of governmental experts (GGE) to consider definitions to standardize levels 
of human judgment or control over AWS in order to ensure that humans 
remain accountable for the acts of machines. The GGE is focused most sig-
nificantly on ensuring that the employment of Lethal AWS (LAWS) during 
hostilities is consistent with LOAC. This work is designed to close a per-
ceived “gap” in the law exposed by LAWS. Yet whatever standard emerges 
from this process is unlikely to be an effective and reliable guide for ensuring 
that AWS operating in compliance with LOAC.   
Furthermore, some nongovernmental groups (NGOs) and concerned 
States believe it would be unfair to hold a commander accountable for an 
autonomous weapon system that acts unpredictably, but that is the way that 
the military operates—imbuing military command with plenary authority 
and accountability over the force.5 The CCW GGE effort is unlikely to pro-
duce detailed, widely accepted rules that meaningfully improve upon this 
paradigm. Operational military commanders already are accountable for 
their employment of AI weapon systems during armed conflict – the focus 
of Part V.   
Part V explores human accountability, embodied in the military com-
mander. The military commander is accountable for the employment of AI 
weapon systems and all lines of effort supporting the prosecution of the war 
effort under his or her direction. Direct, individual command accountability 
is longstanding and complete. The commensurate burden of accountability 
for all military operations—including AI-enabled attacks in armed conflict—
resides at the top of the chain of command. This accountability may be in 
the form of criminal law, but it also includes an array of administrative and 
 
5. The NGOs are focused, it appears, solely on criminal accountability, which is a nar-
row subset of overall military accountability. It might be unfair to hold a commander crim-
inally responsible for an autonomous system’s mistakes, but it would not be unfair to hold 












non-judicial measures. Direct accountability covers every occurrence that 
unfolds during armed conflict, including those in which international crimi-
nal courts lack jurisdiction or have insufficient evidence, so it regulates com-
mander’s behavior even when they lack criminal intent, and indeed, even if 
they are not directly “at fault.” 
Part VI concludes that the direct and individual accountability of the 
commander has the benefit of being longstanding, widely understood, and 
intuitively appreciated by line officers and military leaders; it is part of mili-
tary culture. While it may utilize legal processes, including the military justice 
system, it is not wholly encumbered by or dependent on them. While com-
manders are still subject to criminal penalties for war crimes, military ac-
countability also includes an array of nonjudicial and administrative sanc-
tions. The commander’s accountability over AI weapon systems is especially 
compelling because unlike conventional weapons there are no additional per-
sons (or fewer persons) on which to place the onus of blame if something 
goes wrong.   
 
II. AI IN FUTURE U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS  
 
The term “AI” generally means the “ability of a computer system to solve 
problems and to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelli-
gence.”6 AI involves machines exercising executive functions to make inde-
pendent, data-based decisions, but predefined behavioral boundaries may 
limit the range of behaviors. Prediction is one of the most vexing tasks of 
the operational commander. Achieving AI can be accomplished through sev-
eral means, such as machine learning, deep learning, and edge computing. 
Machine learning is a subset of AI that uses algorithms that can self-modify 
and produces an AI model without direct human intervention. “To a large 
extent, Machine Learning systems program themselves.”7 Deep learning in-
volves numerous layers of these algorithms, with each layer analyzing the 
data in an artificial “neural network” that compounds linear analysis and is 
designed to imitate the functions of the brain. Networks may leverage the 
power of “edge” computing that places computations and data storage in a 
network distributed forward, at sea or on the battlefield, closer to the loca-
tion where it is needed.   
 
 
6. GREGORY C. ALLEN, UNDERSTANDING AI TECHNOLOGY 5 (2020), https://www. 
ai.mil/docs/Understanding%20AI%20Technology.pdf. 












A. The DoD Approach to AI 
 
The U.S. Defense Innovation Board proposes five ethical principles for the 
employment of AI in defense, which were subsequently adopted by the Sec-
retary of Defense on February 24, 2020.8 The principles require that such 
systems be responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable.9 In ap-
plying these principles, the Department of Defense (DoD) requires its per-
sonnel to be “responsible for the development, deployment, and use” of AI 
capabilities, while exercising “appropriate levels of judgment and care.” Fur-
ther, DoD will take “deliberate steps to minimize unintended bias in AI ca-
pabilities.”10 Armed forces personnel that develop and deploy AI capabilities 
must “possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development 
processes, and operational methods” applicable to such capabilities, includ-
ing “transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design pro-
cedure and documentation.”11 The “safety, security, and effectiveness” of AI 
capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance throughout their lifecy-
cles. DoD has directed its AI systems will also be reliable, having “explicit, 
well-defined uses.” Lastly, the Pentagon will ensure that AI is engineered to 
fulfill its intended function, and to “detect and avoid unintended 
 
8. C. Todd Lopez, DoD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence, DEFENSE.GOV 
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2094085/dod-
adopts-5-principles-of-artificial-intelligence-ethics/; see also Press Release, U.S. Department 
of Defense, DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for Artificial Intelligence (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-
ethical-principles-for-artificial-intelligence/.  
9. These form five pillars of U.S. development and employment of AI systems clustered 
around: 
(1) responsible use based on “appropriate levels of judgment and care;”  
(2) equitable use that takes “deliberate steps to minimize unintended bias” in AI;  
(3) use of AI that is “transparent and auditable,” such that DoD personnel understand 
the technology, grasp how it is developed and its comprehend its operational applications;  
(4) reliable of AI capabilities that are safe, secure and effective; and  
(5) subject to governance designed to avoid unintended consequences, and that has 
built in “kill switches” or “circuit breakers” to deactivate lethal systems that demonstrate 
“unintended behavior.”  
DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD, AI PRINCIPLES: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ETHICAL 
USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENT 27–41 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-















consequences.”12 Systems that veer off course and display unexpected action 
will be disengaged or deactivated.13  
These principles should be read in conjunction with the definition of AI 
in the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act: 
 
(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredicta-
ble circumstance without significant human oversight, or that can learn 
from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets. 
 
(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, 
or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cogni-
tion, planning, learning, communication, or physical action. 
 
(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, Including 
cognitive architectures and neural networks. 
 
(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to ap-
proximate a cognitive task. 
 
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent 
software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, 
planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, and act-
ing.14 
 
This definition is further developed by the DoD Digital Modernization 
Strategy, which defines AI as machines that perform tasks that inform or 
reach decisions normally requiring human intelligence, such as pattern recog-
nition, and forming conclusions and making predictions based upon “expe-
rience” (data).15  
 
B. DoD and Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) 
 
DoD has embarked on a major effort to apply AI to national security mis-
sions, including autonomous weapons.16 Current AI military applications are 




14. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. 
L. No. 115-232, § 238, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018).  
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIGITAL MODERNIZATION STRATEGY 44 (2019). 












defined undertakings assigned by human experts. While it may be decades 
before general AI is achievable and integrated into the armed forces, defense 
applications already use machine learning to aid a range of military activities, 
from conducting predictive aircraft maintenance to processing intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance that inform military decisions.17  
DoD defines autonomous weapons as those that, “once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by the human opera-
tor.”18 This definition includes human-supervised autonomous weapons that 
are designed to allow human operators to override the processes of the 
weapon but can “select and engage targets without further human input” 
after they are activated.19  
The Pentagon has operated semi-autonomous (or more accurately, “au-
tomated”)20 systems for decades. The DoD defines “semi-autonomous 
weapon systems” as: 
 
A weapon system that, once activated, is intended to only engage individual 
targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human oper-
ator. This includes: 
 
Semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for engage-
ment-related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking, 
and identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets to human opera-
tors; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or providing ter-
minal guidance to home in on selected targets, provided that human con-
trol is retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific 
target groups for engagement.21 
 
The Navy’s Phalanx or “Close in Weapons System” (CIWS, or “C-
whiz”) is a semi-autonomous weapon system. The CIWS is part of the Aegis 
 
17. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Artificial Intelligence Will Detect Hidden Targets in 2020 Wargame, 
BREAKING DEFENSE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/artificial-in-
telligence-will-detect-hidden-targets-in-2020-wargame/. 
18. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13 
(2012) (Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/ Doc-
uments/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive 3000.09]. See also 
United States, Characteristics of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.7 (Nov. 10, 2017).  
19. DoD Directive 3000.09 supra note 18, at 13–14. 
20. PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
WAR 31 (2018).  












Combat System that integrates vertical-launch missiles and the Phalanx point 
defense gattling gun into a comprehensive anti-air warfare and anti-ballistic 
missile suite that can, if enabled, automatically track, target, and destroy in-
coming missiles and aircraft.22 Aegis integrates computer and radar technol-
ogy that can be configured to independently detect, control and engage in-
bound enemy targets for anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense func-
tions.23 Humans are too slow to sort the data and make a timely decision. 
The system is emblematic of automatic or semi-autonomous systems in that 
humans control the production, programming, and application of the 
weapon.24 The CIWS can be activated to run without humans “in the loop” 
of decision making, subject to an operator’s decision to turn the system on 
or off – relegating the human to “on the loop.” Semi-autonomous weapons 
also include: “fire and forget” or “lock-on-after-launch” homing munitions 
that rely on established tactics, techniques and procedures to maximize the 
probability of striking only targets within the seeker’s “acquisition basket” 
that have been pre-selected by a human operator.25 Aegis is in use by the 
naval forces of the United States, Japan, Spain, Norway, Korea and Australia, 
and is part of NATO’s European missile defense system. As hypersonic mis-
siles enter the inventories of the China, Russia, and the United States, as well 
as middle powers, France, Germany, Japan, and India, considerations such 
as time compression will become even more imperative.26  
The relationship between the weapon and the operator raises ethical and 
legal issues regarding the role of humans, and the autonomy of machines, in 
making life-and-death decisions during armed conflict. The ethical issues 
concern the normative behavioral implications of using AI, while the legal 
issues concern the applicability of international rules governing armed 
 
22. Mk 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), AMERICA’S NAVY, https://www. 
navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167831/mk-15-phalanx-close-
in-weapon-system-ciws/#:~:text=MK%2015%20Phalanx%20CIWS%20provides,have 
%20penetrated%20other%20fleet%20defenses (last updated Jan. 15, 2019). The Aegis 
Combat System is used by naval forces of the United States, Japan, Spain, Norway, Korea, 
and Australia, and is part of Japan’s and NATO’s European missile defense system.  
23. Joseph T. Threston, The AEGIS Combat System, 121 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL, 
Oct. 2009, at 109, 111; Kelsey D. Atherton, Are Killer Robots the Future of War? Parsing the 
Facts on Autonomous Weapons, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov 15, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/11/15/magazine/autonomous-robots-weapons.html.  
24. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CON-
FLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 124–27 (2009).  
25. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 18, at 14. 
26. KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45811, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS: 












conflict. AI may not be well-suited for all combat missions. There may be 
insufficient data to generate accurate patterns of behavior or the data may 
be ambiguous and not provide clear or tangible direction. AI may never be 
appropriate, due to ethical considerations rather than legal barriers, for some 
situations that pose catastrophic risk of failure, such as the decision to launch 
nuclear weapons. Even some tactical situations pose particularly complex 
problems that may require exceptionally nuanced trade-offs, special empa-
thy, or choices among seemingly divergent ethics, or that implicate direct 
individual accountability. While there are clear situations in which the use of 
AI may not be appropriate, that does not obviate the technological impera-
tive to apply AI throughout the networked force.  
 
III. AWS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT  
 
Like any other method or means of warfare, AWS is subject to legal and 
policy considerations in design, development, testing, evaluation, and use. 
The United States has stated that “[a]lthough technology changes, the U.S. 
commitment to the law of war . . . does not.”27 The use of AWS in the kill 
chain must comply with LOAC.28 LOAC stipulates that the right of 
 
27. Christopher A. Ford, AI, Human-Machine Interaction, and Autonomous Weapons: Think-
ing Carefully About Taking ‘Killer Robots’ Seriously, 1 ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY PAPERS 1, 2 (2020).  
28. The law of armed conflict is also referred to as “international humanitarian law,” 
and forms the body of rules and regimes that regulate armed conflict. It is generally regarded 
as synonymous with the “law of war.” OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 1.3.1.2 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; id. § 2.2; HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEAD-
QUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶¶ 1–4 (2019) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. 
COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.1 (2017) [hereinafter 












combatants to choose their methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.29 
States are responsible for ensuring that their armed forces comply with 
LOAC.30  
 
A. DoD Legal Review of Weapons and Weapon Systems 
 
States Party to Additional Protocol I must subject any new “weapon, means 
or method” of warfare to legal review to ensure that its employment is not 
prohibited by law.31 The U.S. position is that only weapons (means) must be 
reviewed as a matter of customary international law.32 DoD tests, evaluates, 
and reviews weapons in accordance with their proposed use in physical and 
operational environments, anticipated rules of engagement, concepts of op-
erations, and tactics, techniques and procedures that would govern their use. 
Weapons review must ensure new weapons or munitions do not cause suf-
fering that is manifestly disproportionate to the military advantage reasona-
bly expected from their use. States must determine whether a weapon can 
be controlled in such a manner that it is capable of being directed against a 
lawful target. In this regard, autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons un-
dergo special reviews by the military Services and DoD before they enter 
formal development.33  
Although the United States is not a State Party to Additional Protocol I, 
it conducts a legal review of all new weapons to ensure they “comply with 
applicable treaties and international agreements . . . customary international 
 
29. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional 
Protocol I]. 
30. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
31. Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 36 (new weapons). It is debatable whether 
this rule has crystallized into customary international law. See Natalia Jevglevskaja, Weapons 
Review Obligation under Customary International Law, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW. STUDIES 186, 
220–21 (2018).  
32. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 6.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶ 2-4; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 9.1. 












law, and the law of armed conflict.”34 This review is one component of the 
DoD Law of War Program, which establishes policy to “comply with the 
law of war during all armed conflicts . . . and in all other military opera-
tions.”35 The requirement is implemented, in part, by the armed services 
through the uniformed judge advocates.36 
Sometimes the lawfulness of a method or means of warfare is debatable. 
For example, during the Vietnam War, the United States coupled airpower 
with the widespread use of anti-personnel weapons, napalm and cluster mu-
nitions, and it employed the new, small-caliber (5.56x45mm) M-16 rife, en-
gaged in the Phoenix Program of political assassination, and destroyed crops 
to deprive insurgents of food in the countryside.37 While States may differ in 
their interpretation of the lawfulness of weapons, the key to the rule of law 
is that those who develop and employ weapons, and those who decide upon 
their use, have certain duties under LOAC.38  
New weapons may require clarification of existing law or development 
of new law to ensure they balance considerations of humanity and military 
necessity.39 It is not foreseeable that the mere incorporation of AI into a 
 
34. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition 
System 9 (2020) [hereinafter DoD Directive 5000.01]. See also U.S. Department of Defense, 
DoD Instruction 5500.15, Review of Legality of Weapons under International Law (1974).  
35. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2311.01, DoD Law of War Program 
§ 1.2(a) (2020), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf [hereinafter 
DoD Directive 2311.01].  
36. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 27-53, Legal Review of Weapons 
and Weapons Systems ¶ 4.f (2019) (“The Judge Advocate General’s designee. TJAG’s de-
signee will––(1) Review weapons and weapon systems, including cyber weapons and cyber 
weapon systems, in accordance with this regulation to determine whether the weapons, 
weapon systems, cyber weapons, and cyber weapon systems and their intended use in com-
bat are consistent with the international legal standards considered binding by the United 
States Government, whether derived from international agreements, customary interna-
tional law, or a combination thereof.”); see also Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST 
5000.2F, Defense Acquisition System and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System Implementation, encl. 3, ¶ 10(a) (2019) (“All potential weapons and weapon systems 
developed, acquired, or procured by the DON will be reviewed by the Judge Advocate 
General (JAG) of the Navy to ensure that the intended use of such weapons or weapon 
systems is consistent with domestic and international law.”); Secretary of the Air Force, AFI 
51-401, The Laws of War ¶ 2.1.2 (2018). 
37. W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW REVIEW 511, 512 (2006); Richard Falk, Law and Responsibility in Warfare: The 
Vietnam Experience, 4 INSTANT RESEARCH ON PEACE AND VIOLENCE 1, 4–8 (1974).  
38. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 283 (2009). 













weapon system would make a new weapon unlawful, as AI is not prohibited 
or restricted by any specific rule of law or treaty.40  
 
B. DoD Compliance with LOAC 
 
LOAC is “that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed 
force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both 
international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; 
and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent 
States.”41 It is DoD policy to comply with LOAC “during all armed conflicts, 
however characterized. In all other military operations, members of the DoD 
Components will continue to act consistent with the law of war’s fundamen-
tal principles and rules.”42 This duty includes the obligation to “respect and 
to ensure respect” found in the the 1949 Geneva Conventions.43 Compliance 
with LOAC conditions military effectiveness, encourages reciprocity by the 
 
40. For example, the Russia Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone appears to be 
an unlawful weapon, per se, under the ENMOD Convention. Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. 1(1), 
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. See Dave Makichuk, Russia to Test ‘Doomsday 
Drone’ in High Arctic, ASIA TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/russia-
set-to-test-doomsday-drone-in-high-arctic/; Franz-Stefan Gady, Russia (Once Again) An-
nounces Start of Sea Trials of ‘Doomsday Weapon,’ THE DIPLOMAT (Dec 27, 2018), https://the-
diplomat.com/2018/12/russia-once-again-announces-start-of-sea-trials-of-doomsday-
weapon/. Russia (May 30, 1978), China (June 8, 2005), Japan (June 9, 1982), the United 
States (January 17, 1980), and the United Kingdom (May 16, 1978) are parties as of the date 
indicated to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques. Disarmament: Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publica-
tion/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVI/XXVI-1.en.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2021). 
41. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 1.3; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-4–1-6; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.2. 
42. DoD Directive 2311.01, supra note 35, § 1.2(a) . 
43. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [herein-
after Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention (III) Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 












adversary, and builds political support and legitimacy at home.44 Rules of 
LOAC are based on key principles formed through treaties and customary 
international law, and mandate that the use of force in armed conflict is 
based on the principles of military necessity, humanity, proportionality, dis-
tinction, and honor or chivalry. New tactics and weapons technology must 
be evaluated to ensure they can be used in armed conflicts in accordance 
with these principles, and States have a duty to ensure that Soldiers, Sailors, 
Marines, and Airmen use them in that lawful fashion.  
Military necessity justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the 
enemy quickly and efficiently, so long as the methods and means employed 
are not otherwise prohibited by the law of war.45 Destruction, seizure of per-
sons and property, and alternate means of subduing an enemy, such as prop-
aganda and intelligence gathering, are all justified during armed conflict, 
while causing unnecessary suffering is prohibited. 
Combatants are entitled to inflict destruction, injury, and death on enemy 
combatants and lawful military targets.46 The principle of humanity, how-
ever, forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction beyond what is 
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.47 Elementary consid-
erations of humanity may be regarded as the inverse of military necessity, 
 
44. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL , supra note 28, § 18.2. 
45. Id. § 2.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 
28, ¶¶ 1-23–1-27; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS supra 
note 28, § 5.3.1. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opin-
ion, 1996 I.C.J Rep. 226, ¶ 140 (July 8); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW r. 70 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). For historical con-
text, see U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 (commonly referred to as the 
Lieber Code). 
46. Exec. Order No. 13,732, 3 C.F.R. § 13732 (2016); Jennifer O’Connor, General 
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Address at NYU School of Law: Applying the Law 
of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield (Nov. 28, 2016), JUST SECURITY, https://www.just-
security.org/34977/applying-law-targeting-modern-battlefield%E2%80%8E-full-speech-
dod-general-counsel-jennifer-oconnor/ (“The citizen who does not participate in hostilities 
is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.”). 
47. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.3; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-28–1-30; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.2. See also Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 218 
(June 27). For historical context, see 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 67, at 
227 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (The principle of humanity “postulates that all 
such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the oppo-












since unnecessary actions are prohibited.48 Generally, suffering is unneces-
sary if it is the inevitable result of the normal use and reasonably anticipated 
effects of military action that is needless, superfluous, or manifestly dispro-
portionate in relation to the anticipated military advantage.49  
The principle of proportionality dictates that combatants must refrain 
from attacks in which the expected loss or injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects are excessive compared to the anticipated concrete and direct 
military advantage.50 The principle of proportionality does not spare civilians 
from harm that results from attacks, but the harm to civilians or civilian ob-
jects, or collateral damage, must not be excessive in relation to the expected 
military advantage.  
Distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between the 
armed forces and the civilian population.51 Methods and means of warfare 
must discriminate between military and non-military targets, and especially 
between combatants and civilians. Additional Protocol I states that precau-
tions in attack also encompass a duty by defending belligerents to “endeavor 
to remove” the civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives, a 
concept which overlaps with the principle of distinction.52 The United States 
is not a State Party to AP I, but customary international law requires parties 
 
48. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); DOD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.3.1.1. 
49. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 6.6; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1–28. See also MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE 
AND CONTROVERSIES § 8.368 (2019). 
50. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, §§ 2.4, 5.1.2.5; COMMANDER’S HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-44–1-48; COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, §§ 5.3.3, 9.1.2. See also 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 29, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(b); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45, at 14; Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 
1841), 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1840-1841, at 1129 (1857). 
51. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.5; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-34–1-43; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.4. For historical context, see Letter 
from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Senator Edward 
Kennedy (Sept. 22, 1972), reprinted in 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 
(1973); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942) (“By universal agreement and practice, the 
law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of 
belligerent nations . . . .”). 













to a conflict, “to the extent feasible,” to remove civilian persons and objects 
under its control “from the vicinity of military objectives.”53 
Not only must attacks comply with the rule of proportionality and dis-
tinction, but combatants also must ensure feasible precautions are taken to 
reduce incidental harm to civilians, other protected persons, and civilian ob-
jects.54 Feasible precautions are those that are practicable or practically pos-
sible, taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the time, including 
humanitarian and military considerations.55 Such precautions are wide rang-
ing. Depending on the weapon system and the operating environment, pre-
cautions may require combatants to have an intimate grasp of how the 
weapon system functions and its relationship with that environment.  
While not legally required for the deployment of every AWS, potential 
safeguards may include the following warning and monitoring mechanisms: 
  
• operating status of the weapon system in real time so the commander 
can ensure it is operating within its programmed parameters;  
• override functions;  
• ability to assert positive human control during operations; 
• ability to enable or disable learning functions; 
• checks on how the system acquires and develops “learned behavior;” 
and 





53. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45, r. 24. 
54. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5.11; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-44–1-45; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 8.3.1. See also Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 29, art. 57. Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel John Cherry, USMC, and Squadron 
Leader Kieran Tinkler, RAF, both of the Stockton Center for International Law, who con-
tributed to this analysis. 
55. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5.14; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶ 2-12; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON 












Combatants also must understand the targeting functions of the system, 
to include: 
 
• how the weapon system defines targets;56  
• ensuring that target functionality is set within only pre-defined 
boundaries; 
• geographic restrictions; 
• setting temporal restrictions on operation;  
• the ability of the AWS to transition to preconfigured tests and a “safe 
state” in the event of critical systems failure. 
 
Some of these safeguards may imply real-time control over the system, 
e.g. the ability to assert positive human control during operation and over-
ride functions. This element is not legally essential, however. Many existing 
weapons without AI cannot be recalled or aborted and lack positive human 
control during operations, so imposing additional restrictions for AI systems 
would be an extraordinary decision based on policy and not the law.  
Chivalry or honor is a core value of U.S. armed forces, and reflects an 
historic canon of fairness and observance of formalities and courtesies that 
forbid breaking trust with the enemy.57 In particular, honor requires good 
faith on the part of belligerents to refrain from taking advantage of an op-
ponent’s adherence to the law by falsely claiming the law’s protections, as in 
offering a false surrender in the hope of ambushing enemy forces. 
The principles pose challenges in the context of fully autonomous weap-
ons because such they do not yet exist and there are competing visions for 
how they will operate during armed conflict. The debate over the legality of 
AWS is driven by concern that such weapons must have a sufficiently rich 
human role in their design, production and operation, to ameliorate ethical 
concerns and ensure human accountability for compliance with LOAC. 
These issues are playing out at discussions held under the auspices of the 
UN Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) through a Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE).  
 
56. The commander would have to know how an AI system would define a target or, 
in the alternative, how a system would act on the identification of the target by a human. 
57. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, § 2.6.2.2; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, ¶¶ 1-31–1-33; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 28, § 5.3.5. For historical context, see 2 
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 67, 84–85 (Ronald F. Roxburgh 












IV. CCW GGE FOCUS ON HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTION 
 
The CCW effort is focused on identifying concerns and developing general 
principles associated with human-machine interaction, applicability of inter-
national law, and examining how those principles may be operationalized. 
Many believe new standards governing AI in military systems are required to 
ensure some threshold level of human interface or control in order to close 
a perceived gap in accountability.58 “Smart” machines, they believe, defy “tra-
ditional ways of ascription” because no person has enough control to be 
accountable for them.59 If AI fails to account for LOAC as effectively as a 
human mind, where does accountability lie? This view suggests that the man-
ufacturer cannot be held liable for acts that it could not have predicted or 
even foreseen.60 For proponents of regulation, it seems equally unfair to im-
pose liability on commanders for actions of machines over which they 
“could not have sufficient control.”61  
To address these questions, in 2013 the High Contracting Parties of the 
CCW decided to convene the following year an informal gathering of a meet-
ing of experts to consider LAWS and their potential compatibility and com-
pliance with LOAC, in particular, the principles of international humanitar-
ian law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens Clause and customary 
law.62 The CCW already regulates certain conventional weapons, with proto-
cols that prohibit the use of non-detectable fragments (Protocol I), regulate 
employment of landmines and booby-traps (Protocol II) and incendiary 
 
58. See, e.g., Chairperson, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2014/3 (June 11, 2014) 
[hereinafter Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIND 
THE GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS (2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots. 
59. Andreas Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learn-
ing Automata, 6 ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 176, 177 (2004). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 183. 
62. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Report, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/MSP/2013/10 (Dec. 16, 2013); Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts, supra 
note 58, ¶ 26. See also Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have In-












weapons (Protocol III), prohibit the use of blinding lasers (Protocol IV), and 
regulate explosive remnants of war (Protocol V).63  
From 2014 to 2016, informal meetings of experts were convened to ex-
plore these questions within the framework of the CCW.64 In 2015, Germany 
as chair, submitted a “Food for Thought” paper that outlined many of the 
military, technological, ethical, and legal issues associated with the use of 
LAWS.65 In 2016, the Chairperson of the meeting, Ambassador Michael Bi-
ontino of Germany, prepared for submission to the CCW Review Confer-
ence a paper in his personal capacity containing recommendations for estab-
lishment of a CCW Group of Government Experts (GGE) to begin meeting 
in 2017 to address options relating to emerging technologies and LAWS.66  
Accountability has been central to the debate over autonomous weapons 
at the GGE.67 Meeting in 2017, the GGE held discussions on LAWS 
 
63. See Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Pro-
tocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (Protocol II); Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 
1996 May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 (Protocol II, amended); Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171 (Protocol 
III); Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 2024 U.N.T.S. 163 (Protocol IV); 
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively In-
jurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100 (Protocol V).  
64. Report of 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts, supra note 58; Chairperson, Informal 
Meeting of Experts, Revised Annotated Programme of Work for the Informal Meeting of 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Geneva, 13 – 17 April 2015, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/MSP/2015/WP.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 11, 2015). 
65. Chairperson, Food-for-Thought Paper, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.1 
(Sept. 4, 2017). 
66. Chairperson, Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS) annex, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.V/2 (June 2, 2016) (Rec-
ommendations to the 2016 Review Conference). 
67. Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of 
the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the 
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3 
(Oct. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Report of the 2018 Session of the GGE]; Group of Govern-
mental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of the 2017 Session Group of 













technology, military effects, and ethical and legal issues based on the Chair-
person’s 2015 “Food for Thought” paper.68 The GGE met twice in both 
2018 and 2019.69 
The lines of argument have coalesced around whether LAWS should be 
subject to a new CCW protocol.70 Some States propose negotiation of Pro-
tocol VI to the Convention to regulate or even ban LAWS – the latter option 
is supported by some NGOs.71 Although the ICRC has not joined the call 
for a ban, it is moving in the direction of support for drafting a new protocol, 
at least to clarify the scope of human control in LAWS.72 The European 
Parliament seeks a binding treaty to stop the development, production, or 
use of LAWS.73 The Non-aligned Movement supports that outcome as well, 
 
U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/3 (Dec. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Report of the 2017 Session 
of the GGE]. See also Carrie McDougall, Autonomous Weapon Systems and Accountability: Putting 
the Cart Before the Horse, 4 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 74–76 (2019). 
68. Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of 
the 2017 Session Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Sys-
tems (LAWS) (Advanced Version), U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2017/CRP.1 (Nov. 20, 2017) 
[hereinafter Report of the 2017 Session of the GGE (Advanced Version)]; Report of the 
2017 Session of the GGE, supra note 67. 
69. Report of the 2018 Session of the GGE, supra note 67; Group of Governmental 
Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System, 
Report of the 2019 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technol-
ogies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (Sept. 25, 2019). 
70. Report of the 2017 Session of the GGE, supra note 67, ¶ 10. 
71. Matthew Bolton, Membership Secretary, International Committee for Robot Arms 
Control, Closing Statement to the 2015 U.N. CCW Expert Meeting, ICRAC (Apr. 17, 2015), 
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CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, KEY ELEMENTS OF A TREATY ON FULLY AUTONO-
MOUS WEAPONS 3 (2019), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 
03/Key-Elements-of-a-Treaty-on-Fully-Autonomous-Weapons.pdf [hereinafter KEY ELE-
MENTS OF A TREATY].  
72. International Committee of the Red Cross, Statement to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, March 25–29, 2019, Geneva, https://www.unog.ch/ 
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2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/views-icrc-autonomous-weapon-system.  














viewing a new protocol essential to ensuring autonomous functions remain 
under the “direct control and supervision of humans at all times.”74 Nearly 
thirty nations support banning LAWS. Austria and Brazil are among the 
most vocal, but the list also includes Algeria, Bolivia, Cuba, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Palestine, Peru, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.75  
Russia’s position is that each State should set their own standards.76 The 
United States opposes a ban.77 Thus far, no NATO State has supported a 
ban. China purports to support a ban, but it defines LAWS exceedingly nar-
rowly, to include systems with the “impossibility for termination” and that 
operate with “indiscriminate effect.”78 Such weapons are unlawful anyway, 
so the Chinese proposal to “ban” them is entirely specious. The wayward 
Chinese definition of LAWS underscores that there is no agreement on how 
to meaningfully and accurately characterize what it encompasses.  
It is impractical to satisfy the most aspirational desires to ban such 
LAWS; indeed, semi-autonomous weapons already exist and includes a vari-
ety of automated weapons that have been employed by over thirty countries 
for over thirty years.79 In great power competition, the logic of deterrence 
means major powers must develop AI systems, if only to deter potential ad-
versaries. In this sense, systems that use AI will become essential to strategic 
security. Consequently, talk of banning them is simply unrealistic, particularly 
since CCW makes decisions by consensus. Most States agree there is a need 
 
74. Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Other States Par-
ties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, General Principles on Lethal 
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77. United States, Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of 
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28, 2018). 
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for some form of human involvement in the design, development, and use 
of LAWS but stand against new regulation. A new CCW protocol that regu-
lates LAWS without banning them is viewed as a middle ground, although 
even that may not materialize.80  
There are two streams of thought that have been put forward to further 
specify that potential new standard: “meaningful human control” and “ap-
propriate levels of human judgement.”81 
 
A. “Meaningful Human Control” 
 
The U.K. non-governmental organization Article 36 seeks adoption of an 
explicit requirement for “meaningful human control” over the operation of 
AI weapon systems, and specifically over every individual attack.82 Numer-
ous States support this standard, although the definitions of the term vary.83 
Austria supports this standard because it views LAWS as by their nature lying 
outside of “meaningful human control.”84 The problem with “meaningful 
human control” as a standard is that like LAWS itself there is not a single 
interpretation of the term. Some consider it as a concept that ensures human 
 
80. Austria, Brazil & Chile, Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally Binding 
Instrument that Addresses the Legal, Humanitarian and Ethical Concerns Posed by Emerg-
ing Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.7 (Aug. 30, 2018). 
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control during the operation of a weapon (throughout the duration of an 
attack). Many proponents argue there is a temporal link between the initial 
assessment of LOAC in the context of conditions that justify using a 
weapon, and the assessment that is ongoing throughout the duration of the 
attack. If this link is broken, it raises problems with the human control over 
implementation of the law of war—in particular, the principles of propor-
tionality, distinction and precautions. Austria questions whether a propor-
tionality assessment made on the front end of the kill chain will be valid by 
the time the ordinance lands on the target.85 The concern arises because the 
battlespace is dynamic. There is a risk that human-informed decisions pro-
grammed into LAWS before an attack will not be durable throughout the 
entire kill chain, as conditions quickly change.86 The principle of proportion-
ality requires an unbroken temporal link between the plan and the lethal 
strike so that proportionality is re-evaluated at each step of the chain. The 
related concept of precautions in attack may also be difficult for LAWS to 
implement without human intervention because it is unclear whether the in-
itial plans reviewed by humans and executed by the machine would be capa-
ble of adjusting to dynamic battlefield conditions.87 Michael C. Horowitz and 
Paul Scharre defined meaningful human control as a three-part test, which 
has become another influential standard for the term: 
 
1. Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about the 
use of weapons; 
2. Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness 
of the action they are taking, given what they know about the target, the 
weapon, and the context for action; 
3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are properly 
trained, to ensure effective control over the use of the weapon.88 
 
The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots states that attacks that lack “mean-
ingful human control” are unethical because they undermine human dignity 
by delegating “life-and-death decisions to inanimate machines” unable to 
comprehend the value of human life.89 This approach finds it repugnant that 
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targeting during armed conflict could be done without control by a “true 
moral agent in the form of a human,” who has a “conscience and the faculty 
of moral judgment,” even if human judgment is inherently flawed.90 Ma-
chines would be worse, they suggest, because they are incapable of the judg-
ment required to comply with LOAC, such as weighing the proportionality 
of an attack. For example, Austria suggests that it is problematic to delegate 
to a robot weapon the assessment of whether an enemy soldier is “hors de 
combat.”91 In this view, it is unrealistic that LAWS could distinguish whether 
an enemy soldier was wounded or in the process of surrendering.92 (It has 
been thirty years, however, since five Iraqi soldiers attempted to surrender 
to an unarmed U.S. Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle).93  
Proponents of “meaningful human control,” suggest “‘meaningful’, ‘ef-
fective’ or ‘appropriate’ human control would be the type and degree of con-
trol that preserves human agency and upholds moral responsibility in deci-
sions to use force.”94 “Control,” advocates say, is a higher and broader stand-
ard than alternatives, such as “judgment.” “Meaningful” control qualifies 
that such control must be more than superficial and is “less specific or out-
come driven” than alternatives, such as “appropriate” or “effective” con-
trol.95 This standard requires a sufficiently direct and close connection to be 
maintained between the human intent of the user and the eventual conse-
quences of the operation of the weapon system in a specific attack. A human 
must always be “in the loop,” particularly for selecting and engaging targets. 
But this position arguably bans LAWS, since such systems cease to be au-
tonomous.96  
More human control, however, does not necessarily mean more mean-
ingful human control. If LAWS have greater accuracy, for example, they may 
be able to better identify and more accurately strike a specific location on a 
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target with a smaller munition, such as a vulnerable hatch on an armored 
vehicle, with a reduced blast radius, minimizing collateral damage. In that 
case, less direct human control over the weapon could produce greater real-
ization of the intention of the commander, which is to destroy the target 
while minimizing collateral effects. The United States believes that concerns 
expressed through human control can be better addressed by ensuring that 
LAWS are subject to “appropriate levels of human judgment.”  
 
B. “Appropriate Levels of Human Judgment” 
 
The DoD requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems 
shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise “appropri-
ate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”97 The United States has 
offered this standard during discussions at the GGE, noting that there is no 
single metric for determining the correct level of human control or judgment 
to be exercised over the use of force in AWS.98 Human judgment over the 
use of force is different than human control over the use of force. For ex-
ample, if the operator is reflexively pressing a button to approve strikes rec-
ommended by the weapon system, it could be argued that there is control, 
but little judgment is being exercised.99 
“Appropriate levels of human judgment” is viewed as a holistic standard 
that accounts for the totality of the circumstances in the employment of a 
weapon. There is neither a single metric for what constitutes “appropriate 
levels,” of judgment, just as there is not for what type of control would be 
“meaningful.” Factors that are considered in determining the appropriate 
level of human judgment include the characteristics and features of the 
weapon system, how it will be employed in a specific physical operating en-
vironment, and the tactical context of applicable operational concepts and 
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C. The Fruitless Quest for a Common Standard  
 
The terms under debate at the GGE are semantic, and labels only gain im-
portance once they are defined or explained.101 The disconnect between the 
two competing standards of human-machine integration is widened by addi-
tional concepts offered for consideration. Australia suggests that any use of 
force by LAWS must be executed through a “system of control,” which it 
defines as “an incremental, layered approach,” to exercise human control 
over the weapons, from “design through to engagement.”102 France has 
claimed that there is “no way to define the contours” of each actor’s respon-
sibility–the political and military decision-makers, manufacturers, program-
mers and operators of LAWS.103 It is apparent many participants in the de-
bate over autonomous weapons are talking past each other.104 This dysfunc-
tional dynamic of the negotiations is evident in the array of terms represented 
in the table below used during discussions of human-machine interaction in 
the development, deployment, and use of LAWS.  
 
Maintaining Substantive Human Participation 
Ensuring Meaningful  Involvement 
Exerting Appropriate  Responsibility 
Preserving Sufficient  Supervision 
 Minimum level of  Validation 
 
Minimum 
indispensable extent of 
 Control 
   Judgment 
   Decision 
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The quest to develop a standard for human-machine integration in 
LAWS is motivated by the desire to ensure that humans, who are responsible 
under LOAC for decisions on the battlefield, are held accountable for the 
results of those decisions. Human control over AI systems will be exercised 
in a different manner because it changes the tasks that humans do in armed 
conflict, but it does not take away the responsibility of humans to create a 
gap in accountability. But no matter what terms or standards are used, for 
some observers, if there is a gap it can never be closed for AI systems be-
cause the machine has an informational advantage over the operator, 
whether it is in navigation of autonomous vehicles or radar-based flight con-
trol.106 Humans are too slow, incapable of sifting through enough data 
quickly enough to control the analytical process. This perspective concludes 
that the designer of the machine gradually loses control over it, transferring 
control from the human to the machine itself.107 Humans in the loop are not 
just redundant–as illustrated by the Aegis system–they are disadvanta-
geous.108 
In this respect, it is difficult not to conclude that it will be impossible to 
assign human responsibility for the actions of AWS through some type of 
globally-accepted standard.109 As Russia stated, “[a]ttempts to develop cer-
tain universal parameters of the so-called “critical functions,” for the wide 
variety of anticipated systems, “can hardly give practical results.”110 In the 
end, the CCW GGE process likely will prove a disappointment. Any agree-
ment that emerges from the GGE is likely to be too vague to provide mean-
ingful guidance. 
Fortunately, no new legal standard is needed to ensure accountability of 
AWS during armed conflict. The existing principles and rules in LOAC al-
ready provide a comprehensive and coherent framework that governs the 
use of force, including AI networked weapons. Human accountability for 
the employment and effects of AI weapons derives from the military doc-
trine of command accountability. The commander has direct or individual 
accountability for all actions taken during war, including the employment of 
LAWS. Military commanders bear the burden of full accountability for the 
entire scope of their prosecution of the war effort, including employment of 
 
106. Matthias, supra note 59, at 182. 
107. Id. 
108. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 62, 68 (2007). 
109. Id. 
110. Russia’s Approaches to the Elaboration of a Working Definition and Basic Func-












appropriate weapons during the conflict, how those weapons are applied in 
the operational environment, and the consequences for their successes and 
their failures, both anticipated and unforeseen.  
 
V. MILITARY ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Regardless of the standards for human involvement or oversight of AWS 
that may be adopted by the GGE, it is clear the law binds humans, not ma-
chines.111 Commanders are required to select appropriate and lawful weap-
ons under the circumstances. Some weapons, such as biological weapons or 
poisonous gas, are illegal per se. The Annexed Regulations of Hague Con-
vention (IV) prohibit the use of certain weapons that are “calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering,” and customary law prohibits indiscriminate methods 
and means of warfare.112 The legality of most weapons, however, is based on 
how they are employed by combatants and under the direction of a com-
mander. For example, a rifle is a lawful weapon, but soldiers may on their 
own use it in an unlawful manner or officers may direct its misuse through 
unlawful orders. Likewise, AWS may be appropriate in one circumstance or 
operational environment but not in another. In both cases, the commander 
remains accountable for the discharge of the round. The key for accounta-
bility is that someone is held to account for every method and means of 
warfare, and that person is the military commander.  
All members of the U.S. armed forces have a duty to comply with the 
law of war.113 The United States believes that compliance with the law of war 
aids the commander and the Nation by reinforcing military effectiveness 
through disciplining the application of force and economy of effort, encour-
aging reciprocal respect for the rules by the enemy, and maintaining public 
support and legitimacy for the war effort in a democracy.114 The DoD Law 
of War Program requires U.S. forces to maintain a system of reporting con-
cerning incidents that a unit commander or other responsible official deter-
mines, based on credible information, potentially involves: a war crime; other 
violations of the law of war; or conduct during military operations that would 
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be a war crime if the military operations occurred in the context of an armed 
conflict.115 This program also requires the personal involvement of com-
manders who convene and direct investigations and refer matters to courts 
marital, or to more senior authorities, for disposition.116  
Subordinate commanders have a duty to keep immediate superiors ap-
praised of events and incidents during hostilities.117 All military and U.S. ci-
vilian employees, contractor personnel, and subcontractors assigned to or 
accompanying a DoD Component must report through their chain of com-
mand all reportable incidents, including those involving allegations of non-
DoD personnel having violated the law of war.118 Violations of “reportable 
incidents” may be made to military police, judge advocates, or inspectors 
general. All reports must be forwarded immediately through the chain of 
command to the combatant commander by the most expeditious means 
available.119 If warranted, criminal cases may be brought under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.120 Suspected violators may be charged with “grave 
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, which entail violations against desig-
nated protected persons or property.121 Furthermore, such violations are 
subject to universal jurisdiction, and include murder, torture, mutilation or 
maiming, inhumane treatment, or willfully causing great suffering or injury, 
and they are punishable by death.122 AP I adds other offenses to the list of 
grave breaches: attacks that unleash dangerous forces that will produce “ex-
cessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilians objects,” and 
attacks on demilitarized zones and undefended localities.123 
Commanders are said to be “in command,” meaning they have authority 
over the armed forces, and the “power to give orders and enforce 
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obedience.”124 Commanders are the agents of the State, they exercise author-
ity to control the forces under their command and implement and enforce 
the law of war.125 With the vast authority of commanders comes great re-
sponsibility while they serve in command. These leaders have authority com-
mensurate with their responsibilities, exercised through intermediate subor-
dinate commanders.126  
 
A. The Military Doctrine of Command Accountability 
 
By whatever title they take–commander, commanding officer, comman-
dant–officers who lead units of the armed forces are accountable for the 
performance of the forces subject to their authority.127 In U.S. joint force 
doctrine, the term “command” is all-encompassing, to include the authority 
and responsibility to organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces 
to accomplish missions.128 It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, 
morale and discipline of all subordinates. The art of command flows from 
the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance.129 
“Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s ex-
perience and intuition, enable joint forces to achieve objectives.”130 Histori-
cally, the most senior military officers were held accountable for the general 
performance of their troops in combat. The commander leads through a 
combination of “courage, ethical leadership, judgment, intuition, situational 
awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views….”131 In the Navy, 
commanders are required to observe the principles of international law.132 In 
order to fulfill that responsibility, if there is a conflict between international 
law and other Navy regulations, commanders are authorized to uphold 
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international law.133 The Hague Regulations hold commanders are directly or 
individually responsible for methods and means of warfare during the con-
duct of hostilities.134 
American commanders must authorize the employment of any method 
or means of war and craft appropriate rules of engagement that accomplish 
the mission. Obedience to orders is a cornerstone of military discipline and 
order, and while subordinates owe obedience only to lawful orders, all orders 
are presumed to be lawful unless that presumption is rebutted.135 Accounta-
bility for these orders has always been an inherent element of U.S. military 
leadership.136 Punishment for violations of LOAC fall on individuals for the 
commission of acts committed at their order or command or acts they per-
sonally commit.137 
In the aftermath of World War I and II, States recognized that any per-
son, including heads of state or commanders-in-chief, are subject to the laws 
of war and are liable to criminal prosecution for their violation.138 Military 
commanders are accountable for violations of LOAC that they personally 
commit or that they order their subordinates to commit.139 Leaders may be 
held personally accountable for committing an offense, even when subordi-
nates physically fulfill the material elements of the crime they have di-
rected.140 For example, commanders are directly liable for a range of interna-
tional criminal acts that they commit during the conduct of hostilities: crimes 
against peace (planning and initiating war of aggression); war crimes 
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(violations of the laws or customs of war); and crimes against humanity, in-
cluding murder, extermination, and enslavement.141 The commander’s direct 
or individual accountability includes genocide and crimes against humanity 
that are committed by their forces at their direction, and for the conse-
quences of decisions they have made or authorized for the employment of 
weapons on the battlefield.  
Commanders are individually subject to prosecution for violation of 
other crimes as well, including planning violations of LOAC.142 The com-
mander is accountable for employment of indiscriminate methods or means. 
Nazi Germany’s V-1 and V-2 rockets were indiscriminate missiles because 
they could not be directed at a target. They were used as terrorizing weapons 
by randomly landing in civilian areas.143 The developers of those missiles, 
principally Waffen-SS General Hans Kammler and Wernher von Braun, 
avoided criminal prosecution after the war because Kammler was reportedly 
never found, and von Braun benefited from his singular importance to the 
fledgling American missile program. Perhaps more compelling in the case of 
von Braun, however, was that the Allies had engaged in even more destruc-
tive, indiscriminate bombing of Axis cities. Some 25,000-35,000 civilians 
died in four brutal firebombing raids on Dresden in February 1945, while 
the V-2 rocket is estimated to have killed fewer than 3,000 Londoners.144  
Similarly, Nazi Grand Admiral Karl Döenitz, was tried and convicted at 
Nuremberg for war crimes committed during the war for his role as the com-
mander-in-chief of the German Navy. The International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) found that the Admiral’s order to sink neutral vessels without warning 
when found within declared operational areas was a violation of the 1936 
Naval Protocol, which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare set out in 
the 1930 London Naval Agreement.145 He was also found guilty of violating 
the rescue provisions of the Protocol, finding that “if the commander cannot 
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rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should 
allow it to pass harmless before his periscope.”146  
However, in view of the conduct and arming of British merchant ships 
during the war, the IMT did not find Admiral Döenitz guilty for his conduct 
of unrestricted submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships.147 
Because of the British Admiralty’s order of May 8, 1940, that “all vessels 
should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak,” and the fact that the United States 
admitted to conducting unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific Ocean 
from the first day it entered the war against Japan in 1941, the admiral was 
not sentenced for his breaches of the international law of submarine war-
fare.148 (Döenitz was convicted and served ten years for separate “crimes 
against the peace”). 
In all cases, commanders are accountable for the operational and legal 
judgments inherent in warfighting. Commanders employing an AI weapon 
system are no different. They have an obligation to understand what AWS 
can do in a particular environment in which it is used, like any other 
weapon.149 They must know how the system responds in the field or at sea, 
where it excels and what are its limitations. They are not required to under-
stand the intricacies of how the weapon works–the science and technology 
behind its performance–only appreciate how it functions and performs in 
the battlespace in which it is employed. In the event an AWS proves to be 
indiscriminate the commander would be held to account. Every weapon sys-
tem in the combat zone and every method of training – tactics, techniques 
and procedures – falls within the remit of the commander’s direct or indi-
vidual accountability.  
Human Rights Watch worries that it is “arguably unjust” to hold com-
manders to account for the action of machines “over which they could not 
have sufficient control.”150 “These weapons’ autonomy creates a ‘responsi-
bility gap,’” making it “arguably unjust to hold people responsible where they 
“could not have sufficient control.”151 This notion of responsibility, how-
ever, is too narrow, swallowed by military accountability. Although it may 
seem “unfair” to impose liability on commanders for incidents occurring 
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beyond their immediately control, and to sanction them even for mishaps 
they sought to avoid, the armed forces routinely do just that.152 The U.S. 
armed forces consistently impose accountability on commanders for literally 
everything that occurs throughout his or her entire force, from sexual har-
assment to peacetime ship collisions to battlefield disasters. The burden of 
command, and the unique exposure to perhaps “unfair” liability is simply 
part of direct or individual command accountability and it is subsumed by 
the duty owed by commanders to the armed forces and to the Nation they 
serve.  
As Marco Sassóli states, “it is as fair to hold a commander of a robot 
accountable as it would be to hold accountable a commander who instructs 
a pilot to bomb a target he describes as a military headquarters, but which 
turns out to be a kindergarten.”153 The commander’s accountability, in this 
regard, is complete, even if some outsiders view it as “unfair”–even if the 
commander had no way of personally intervening to ensure a better out-
come, indeed even if the commander optimized training and preparation of 
his or her forces to avoid such an outcome. This is the approach used in 
warship collisions and other operational mishaps in order to hold leaders 
accountable and to develop “lessons learned” to avert future incidents. In 
the culture of direct accountability within the armed forces, loss of faith or 
confidence in the individual commander can result in criminal or adminis-
trative sanctions. For example, after the June 2017 collision by the USS Fitz-
gerald into the Motor Vessel Acx Crystal that killed seven sailors, the com-
manding officer and the officer in charge of the combat information center 
were issued letters of censure.154 The evidence was deemed insufficient to 
prevail against them in a criminal trial, even though the investigation uncov-
ered ineffective command and control and deficiencies in training and navi-
gational skill.155 In cases in which LOAC violations do not rise to the level 
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of war crimes, States typically pursue administrative mechanisms of account-
ability, initiating investigations and imposing non-judicial punishment or ad-
ministrative censure.156  
As a supplement to the criminal process, “administrative procedures, in-
quiries, sanctions, and reforms” may be used to respond to violations of 
LOAC, such as negligent actions that lack criminal culpability.157 For exam-
ple, the investigation of the shootdown by the USS Vincennes of Iran Air 
Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, exonerated the commanding officer of the war-
ship. In that case, the commanding officer gave the order to target what he 
thought was an Iranian F-14 aircraft inbound to attack his warship–a calcu-
lation that proved tragically wrong. Two-hundred ninety civilian Iranian lives 
were lost. After an investigation, the Secretary of Defense concluded that the 
captain acted prudently, given the high threat environment and previous at-
tacks and demonstrations of hostile intent by the forces of the Iranian Rev-
olutionary Guard Corps Navy on U.S. warships.158 The investigating officer, 
a rear admiral, recommended that no administrative or criminal action 
should be taken against the captain. This recommendation was endorsed by 
the Secretary of Defense.159  
Similarly, Laura Dickinson recounts administrative findings of a U.S. 
Army investigation on the errant U.S. airstrike on October 3, 2015, against a 
Kunduz, Afghanistan, hospital operated by the humanitarian organization 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) that killed 24 patients, fourteen staff members 
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and four caretakers.160 A cascade of errors led to the tragic airstrike. Some of 
those involved received administrative penalties or disciplinary action, alt-
hough they were not charged with a crime.161 A comprehensive review of 
tactical directives, pre-deployment training, and rules of engagement fol-
lowed.162 The Secretary of Defense took corrective action to avoid another 
such incident. The military departments were directed to review command-
and-control systems to ensure that they could maintain a “unified under-
standing of the battle space and enhance interoperability.”163 In another in-
cident, this one in Iraq in 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Allen West was fined 
$5,000 and retired after he was found to have threatened the life of an Iraqi 
by discharging a firearm.164 These cases demonstrate that DoD investigates 
mishaps and reviews decisions during hostilities, and takes administrative ac-
tion to supplement criminal prosecution. These measures hold military lead-
ers accountable through non-judicial and administrative processes in cases 
lacking criminal culpability to obtain convictions at trial.  
Commanders may also be held responsible for violations of LOAC com-
mitted by their subordinates if they have failed to properly train their force, 
exercise appropriate oversight, or establish guidance and expectations in 
command environment conducive to compliance with the law. The interna-
tional law doctrine of command responsibility is a subset of the military doc-
trine of command accountability.  
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B. The International Legal Doctrine of Command Responsibility  
 
With military command comes the special duty of oversight. Commanders 
must ensure that their forces are properly trained and adopt and enforce 
rules and procedures for investigating suspected violations of LOAC and 
impose administrative, disciplinary and penal actions to correct them.165 
Commanders have an obligation to take measures within their power and 
appropriate to the circumstances to prevent violations by the forces under 
their command.166  
The United States extends this classic legal doctrine of “command re-
sponsibility” to its outer boundaries. As the Supreme Court held in the Yam-
ashita decision, U.S. commanders are responsible “to some extent” even for 
the actions of their subordinates.167 Edging close to vicarious liability, the 
U.S. position underscores the vast authority and virtually plenary responsi-
bility of U.S. military commanders for the decisions of subordinates. Liability 
attaches to the most senior commander who issues the orders, downward to 
all of the subordinate commanders who transmit and distribute it throughout 
the chain of command.  
The legal doctrine of command or superior responsibility holds the su-
perior officer accountable for the failure to prevent or punish many of the 
war crimes committed by subordinates.168 This legal concept holds the com-
mander liable for “willful blindness” for failing to prevent or stop the illegal 
acts of his or her subordinates.169 Commanders have an affirmative duty to 
prevent LOAC violations, and they may acquire derivative, imputed liability 
by commission or omission.170 They are also responsible for decisions by 
their subordinates to disregard LOAC violations committed by their forces 
that they are aware of, or reasonably should have been aware of, or that they 
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acquiesced in or failed to take action to punish.171 Liability extends beyond 
the direct perpetrators of the crime.172 Commanders also bear responsibility 
for violations of LOAC that they incite, such as placing enemy prisoners of 
war in a place of risk from lynching by an angry mob.173 Military leaders have 
a duty to take “necessary and reasonable measures” to ensure their forces do 
not commit LOAC violations.174 If they do not take such measures they are 
answerable for the acts of omission–actions not performed that are required 
under international law, such as failure to properly supervise and control 
subordinates, and to ensure that they do not perpetrate war crimes. This type 
of inaction may be charged as a dereliction of duty.175  
Officers are also liable for LOAC violations committed by subordinates 
pursuant to manifestly illegal orders they have passed on to those subordi-
nates.176 “Within certain limitations, [subordinate soldiers have] the right to 
assume that the orders of his superiors and the State which he serves and 
which are issued to him are in conformity with international law.”177 In mil-
itary targeting, the legal analysis for a particular strike already has been made 
by superiors or it is already reduced to a check on the part of the pilot or 
soldier, for example, to confirm that the target is indeed the expected 
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building.178 Individual pilots and soldiers are not making in-depth or complex 
legal analysis, which is reserved for higher level echelons. The commander 
cannot be criminally liable for mere errors of judgment, and is only account-
able for an order that is “criminal on its face.”179 Subordinate members of 
the armed forces who carry out the orders are also criminally culpable if the 
orders were manifestly illegal (“execute all the prisoners”).180 Subordinate 
soldiers may presume the lawfulness of their orders and are not held respon-
sible unless such acts are so evidently unlawful or evil as to prevent any rea-
sonable mistake of their legality.181 A manifestly unlawful order is one in 
which a “man of ordinary sense and understanding” would, under the cir-
cumstances, know it to be unlawful.182  
The legal doctrine of command responsibility extends to actions com-
mitted by the forces under the commander’s “effective control,” which 
means that there exists a superior-subordinate relationship.183 Such a rela-
tionship requires that the superior have more than general influence over the 
subordinates, but must have the material ability to prevent or punish the 
commission of the crimes. Merely being “tasked with coordination does not 
necessarily mean to have command and control.”184 Lesser degrees of con-
trol, such as the ability to exercise substantial influence over forces that com-
mitted the crimes, is insufficient to establish command responsibility.185 
“Effective command and control” and “effective authority and control,” 
are synonymous.186 The Statute of the International Criminal Court includes 
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both terms.187 Indicators of effective control are more a matter of evidence 
than substantive law.188 Evidence demonstrates whether a commander had 
the “material ability” or power to prevent offenses and punish their perpe-
trators.189 Indicia of effective control include the commander’s de jure or de 
facto authority to issue orders, especially ordering troops into combat, 
whether his or her orders were actually followed, whether materiel and hu-
man resources were at his or her discretion, and whether he or she held au-
thority to enforce discipline.190 In short, the vicarious criminal liability that 
flows from command responsibility, implicates the commander in many of 
the acts of commission or omission that violate LOAC that are committed 
by subordinate forces. These forces may include AWS in a mixture of dis-
tributed, lethal capabilities on the future battlefield. Even then, command 




The commander is accountable for battlefield action regardless of whether 
subordinates made and compounded errors, machines performed unexpect-
edly, or an incident arises as an unforeseeable consequence of pure happen-
stance or the fog of war. The military doctrine of command accountability 
may not seem to everyone to be “fair” in that the commander is accountable 
for every decision made across the armed forces enterprise and prosecution 
of the war effort, including decisions he or she did not make but nonetheless 
must answer for. The commander’s direct, individual accountability covers 
every aspect of the outcome of specific decisions made by subordinate lead-
ers and service members, failures of intelligence and mission analysis, mis-
takes made by government and private sector civilians accompanying the 
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force, and malperformance of weapons. Ultimately, the military commander 
is accountable for the totality of the employment of forces under his or her 
command, from a handgun to a nuclear missile. In this regard, the com-
mander faces criminal, non-judicial and administrative accountability. The 
commander’s individual, direct accountability for virtually every line of effort 
in prosecuting the war is a strict liability regime of accountability that may 
(or may not) involve criminal sanction. While the commander’s accountabil-
ity may include legal exposure to criminal violations of the law of war, in 
military doctrine its reach is much farther, encompassing non-judicial and 
even non-legal mechanisms. The commander’s accountability is separate and 
distinct from the related legal doctrine in international criminal law of com-
mand responsibility, in which the commander may face legal jeopardy for 
failure to exercise control over forces under command that violate LOAC.  
Commanders authorize lethal force against enemy forces and lawful tar-
gets based upon their rules of engagement and subject to LOAC. These or-
ders are informed by the commander’s understanding of the tactical situa-
tion, training and experience, and the combination of tactics and weapons 
(methods and means). In all cases, the commander is accountable for the 
employment of the weapon. In the case of AI, commanders are accountable 
for calibrating how AWS are employed, how they will be able to “express 
their autonomy,” and designating the parameters or “guardrails” for their 
operation.191 If an autonomous system acts beyond its programmed limita-
tions, the military system holds commanders accountable for failing to an-
ticipate or guard against the danger. Commanders are empowered to deploy 
weapons and they are accountable if those machines mis-perform. Com-
manders are accountable to their superiors in the chain of command for the 
methods and means of warfare that they set in motion, from missiles that 
cannot be recovered in flight to artillery rounds that have left the tube, and 
to AWS, which may be equipped to determine targets based on programmed 
criteria. The commander’s accountability inures to forces that fire errant or 
misguided rounds, weapons that fail to perform as expected, and mistakes 
made throughout the kill chain, and employs weapon systems with autono-
mous functions. This accountability includes criminal and administrative re-
sponsibility, in which commanders and combatants bear personal exposure 
or liability for the weapons they unleash, and are subject to sanction for vi-
olations of the law of war. The pursuit of advancements in weapon systems 
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to ensure an effective, efficient, and more humane approach to warfare has 
been successful because it is coupled with the culture of accountability in 
leadership on the battlefield.  
 
